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
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**BOSNIA: A PRIMER FOR ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT**

by

William A. Clift, Jr.  
Lt Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: DR. R. S. JORDAN

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 1994

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## **ABSTRACT**

**TITLE: Bosnia: A Primer For Engagement And Disengagement**

**AUTHOR: William A. Clift, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF**

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has proven to be one of the most troubling problems facing the world since the end of the cold war. From its origins in the 7th century to the headlines it makes in 1994, a solution to the crisis has not been found. The US Army estimated at least 400,000 troops would be required to stop the fighting between the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims. Additionally, the troops would be required to remain in country for one year in a peacekeeping role. Other solutions have been sought using a combination of UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and NATO airpower. However, the problem with all military solutions is that once the military forces are removed, the conflict generally reemerges unless all sides have agreed to a binding solution. There can only be one lasting solution in this conflict and that must be a negotiated one agreed to by all three sides.

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Clift, Jr. has studied the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict since he was commander of the 28th Bomb Squadron (B-1B aircraft) at McConnell AFB, KS. He has followed the situation through the perspective of a commander and of a J-5 planner for his next position in the Joint Special Operations Command. He holds four Meritorious Service Medals, the Air Medal and the Commendation Medal. He is currently attending the Air War College, class of 1994.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The national security decision making process is highly complex and involves many actors. In some instances, the process involves not just the President along with the Executive Branch and Congress, but also players from foreign nations, many of whom share membership in alliances with us. This paper examines who some of those players are within the context of the particularly troubling problem of Bosnia.

From background to current status, I will examine the situation, taking into account historical as well as contemporary considerations. Such considerations include geography, the nature and extent of the violence, and what the United Nations, the United States, and its allies are doing under the guise of NATO and other international organizations. The subject is complex, but hopefully easily understood if approached step by step. This crisis is at the forefront of America's national decision making and promises to take a lot of its national treasure if we do not examine and fully understand it. It has already lasted for 23 months and is the largest ongoing series of air missions flown over Southern Europe since World War II.  
(4:49)

## **I. RECOMMENDATIONS**

My recommendations are fourfold:

1. First, begin by lifting the UN embargo against importing weapons into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The measure is drastic but we are currently denying the elected government the right to protect itself.
2. Second, enforce the sanctions through the UN on Serbia and Croatia against the import of weapons or warmaking materials into Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are currently no UN troops in place to do so.
3. Third, continue to negotiate on all fronts.



4. Finally, keep in place the current UN resolutions and actions for humanitarian aid, retain the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) for situation monitoring, and use the NATO airbase to deny any aggressor the use of air strikes.

## II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION

Now that we know what my recommendations are, let us look at the history, issues, and facts, and derive a logic pattern so that we can agree or at least come up with tentative solutions to help stop the killing. We should notice that I did not say solve the problem. This is because this problem has been going on for centuries. All we can hope for is to temporarily put an end to the intense violence. **The factions involved must solve the problem themselves.**

The first fact that we need to know is: how did we get to this problem almost overnight? The answer is simple: destruction of the country of Yugoslavia. If we take a moment to look in the back of this paper at Appendix B, we find a map of the former Yugoslavia which has eight states where once a Communist country stood. The heart of this old country is now the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Appendix A. In December 1991, it applied to the European Community (EC) for recognition as an independent state in response to an EC deadline for such requests from the former Yugoslav Republics, Appendix C. (26:3) On March 1, 1992, in a referendum, the people voted for independence, winning approval from 99.4 percent of those voting. (26:3) This is when all of the problems began to surface after years of suppression by the Communists.

Now let us look at the population of the country and see how it is broken down by groups. The most current formal census figures which are provided by the CIA show a total

population of 4,364,574. Of these, 1,905,830 are Muslims, 1,369,262 are Serbians (Greek Orthodox), 755,895 are Croatians (Catholics), and 333,587 are listed as others. (15:8) If we refer to the map again at Appendix B, we see that the two largest states which border Bosnia-Herzegovina are Croatia to the west and Serbia to the east. A quick scan of this paragraph reveals who the allies are and are not for the major factions. A third player in the conflict, besides Serbia and Croatia, is the Moslem world. Various Moslem countries have offered up to 20,000 troops and arms to help their fellow Muslims, but the only overt action by them thus far has been providing humanitarian assistance through the UN. (20:67)

Now let us go back in history and see how the various factions became so antagonistic toward each other. The area's original inhabitants settled there in the 7th century. (30:1) This area was at that time between the outer edges of the Roman Catholic Church (Western Christendom) and the Greek Orthodox Church (Eastern Christendom). A third religion active in this region was a Christian sect called Bogomilism. (30:1) However, in the mid-15th century, the Turks conquered the region and converted many Bogomils to the Islamic faith. The Turks or the Ottoman Empire as we now know it, controlled Bosnia-Herzegovina until the 19th century when the Christian peasants revolted. In 1876, Serbia and Montenegro began to support the revolt. The Russians also intervened in 1878 and helped crush the Ottoman army. The European powers placed the newly-freed Bosnia-Herzegovina under the administration of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1878. (30:2) Now, with three sides and three religions, the tensions began to mount, especially with no common enemy to fight. The Roman Catholic Croatian faction wanted the state to be part of Croatia and the Orthodox Serbian faction wanted to be part of Serbia. The Muslims were claimed by both sides, but in fact they wanted their own state just as it was. In 1908, the Austro-Hungarians wanted to formally annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, which infuriated Serbia. (30:2) It was a Bosnian Serb

named Gavrilo Princip who assassinated Austro-Hungary's Archduke Ferdinand in June 1914, which helped start World War I. (26:--)

After World War I, the three powers agreed to a brief central government and in 1918 formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. (30:2) This did little to ease the friction as mass numbers of Muslims emigrated to Turkey while the Serbs and Croats fought over whether a centralized or loose federated form of government was the most appropriate. The Germans solved this problem by conquering the Yugoslav state in 1941 at the outbreak of World War II. The Croats sided with the Germans for the most part and created the Ustashe movement with a goal of purging the Serbs. (4:17) The Ustashe also tried to form an alliance with the Muslims. Ustashe atrocities opened a blood bath to which hundreds of thousands of civilians and soldiers fell victim. (30:2)

The blood bath subsided after World War II with the rise to power of Tito and the Communists. One fact in Tito's favor was that his parents were both Serb and Croat. He presided over the Republic of Yugoslavia, again as pictured in Appendix B. He also officially recognized the Muslims as a national rather than just a religious group. When Tito died in 1980 and Yugoslavia began to come apart, hard-line Serb and Croat nationalists began to surface, eventually destroying the delicate balance. (10:31) In 1991, as the inter-ethnic conflict picked up, the Yugoslav army discharged 80,000 ethnically Serbian troops that were stationed in Bosnia but let them keep their heavy weapons. (16:1) This force formed the backbone of the Serbian army in Bosnia. The final demise of the USSR and ultimate independence occurred, which brings us to the current situation.

The almost two-year war has resulted in approximately 200,000 deaths from all sides and over 1.5 million refugees. (28:1) Atrocities committed by all sides include massacres of civilians, mass rapes, and "ethnic cleansing" or the driving of an entire population from areas to allow one particular ethnic faction to resettle it. The general consensus is that the Serbs are

the worst offenders in the atrocities tragedy. (21:50) They have been reported, though, to believe or at least profess that the purpose of ethnic cleansing is an escape from Islamic fundamentalism. (17:34) The real fact remains, however, that once atrocities began, all sides saw themselves as victims and wanted reprisals. Already 98 sites in Bosnia and Croatia have been identified as containing mass graves of unknown numbers. (22:14) The West has responded with massive amounts of aid delivered both by air and over land, primarily going to the Muslims, who have been the hardest hit. Additionally, the UN has begun to investigate the atrocity issues as part of an international effort to revive the notion of war crimes.

The Muslims favor a return to a strong central government ruled by all ethnic factions in the country. (30:5) They view the current situation as an outright war sponsored by outside governments against their popularly-elected government. They are the poorest-armed side in the conflict, and due to UN sanctions, no outside arms can be imported into the country to help them. President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has accepted numerous cease fires and peace proposals but to no avail. (28:8)

The Croats are split over their view of what Bosnia should look like. Some favor a coalition government while others favor the creation of a Croatian canton with wide-ranging autonomy and close links to Croatia. Rumors originally abounded that Croatian President Tudjman held private talks with the Serbs to divide the country between them. The Croats are not seen as the primary aggressors in the war. Rather, they have worked both sides of the fence, shifting from one side to the other to protect their interests. A peace agreement or cease-fire was signed by both the Croats and Muslims on March 1, 1994 in Washington, D. C. Only time will tell whether the coalition will hold or whether it was just another broken promise in this struggle.

The primary warring faction is the Serbs. Backed by the Government of Serbia, they have the most power and probably the most to gain. Their leadership by General Mladic is

ruthless and is credited with the worst atrocities. They feel that Bosnia should be broken into three cantons with each ruled by a different ethnic faction. They now hold over two-thirds of the country, including numerous areas in isolation. They are attempting to create ethnically pure areas in the best possible regions in the event on a cease fire. (31:15) Additionally, they continue to have access to the former Yugoslav army assets.

### III. WHAT ARE THE US, UN, AND ALLIES DOING?

Information that was not more than a week old was used in the final revision of this paper. However, more and later-breaking facts could make my thesis, if not my whole paper, irrelevant. But that simply reflects how quickly events are changing in this region, and how relevant to today the subject is.

Before we continue, we need to look at some common definitions to define clearly what we will be talking about. The first one we will look at is the meaning of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary as "Of or relating to the preservation of peace, especially the international supervision of a truce between hostile nations." Another definition fundamental to what the UN, the US, and our allies are doing is peacemaking. Peacemaking is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary as "The act of making peace especially by settling the disputes of others." The understanding of these two terms is basic to what we are trying to do and trying not to do.

As the UN, NATO, and the US in particular become more deeply involved in the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue, we must keep both of these definitions in mind. Today, the UN and NATO are involved both militarily and diplomatically. On the military side, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), headed by Britain's Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, are involved on the ground in Bosnia in the peacekeeping mission. (19:5) That is, their primary mission is

to attempt to keep the peace through their presence in the cities and the countryside. This does not mean that they are actively engaged militarily in fire fights and weapons employment. Rather, they are engaged in delivering supplies to the destitute inhabitants of Sarajevo through convoys and by monitoring the cease fires. The peacemaking effort of the UN is accomplished on the diplomatic side. (3:554) From negotiations with all three sides to monitoring elections, the efforts have until now proven generally fruitless. Temporary truces are usually broken within a matter of hours or minutes. The truce signed between the Muslims and Croats in Washington, DC is the most recent example. As for monetary assistance, the US has contributed over \$550 million in humanitarian aid alone to lessen the severity of the winter and the suffering. (29:6)

A key player in the peacekeeping and peacemaking process of late is Russia. At the start of the conflict the Russians were more concerned with their own problems and showed limited interest. However, as NATO issued a deadline in February 1994 for airstrikes unless Serbian heavy weapons were withdrawn from Sarajevo, the Russians became actively involved in diplomacy with the Serbs, and also introduced 400 troops. (18:20) As a peacemaker, there is no doubt that the Russian government is very much on the Serbian side with their common Slavic affinity. In fact, all of the factions look to the Russian influence as being positive even though tempered with a certain anxiety and uncertainty.

Now we will look at President Clinton's past and present position on Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a candidate and President-elect, Clinton advocated air strikes against the Serbs while his future Secretary of State Warren Christopher derided the Vance-Owen plan, which we will examine shortly. However, in February 1993, after his inauguration, President Clinton embraced the Vance-Owen plan and decided to drop humanitarian aid from the skies over Bosnia instead of paratroopers. In April 1993, he backtracked again by saying that he had not ruled out air strikes or any other option. This statement preceded Secretary

Christopher's trip to Europe to drum up support for military action. His efforts fell on deaf ears from our NATO allies. Then, after the mission failed in May 1993, President Clinton shifted to a containment of the war, ceding leadership to the Russians. (24:30) In June, he had Madeleine Albright, the US Permanent Representative to the UN, advocate the removal of the arms embargo to Bosnia while still seeking a negotiated settlement to the situation. (12:479) Then when the water seemed the muddiest and all his threats hollow, NATO was again embraced by President Clinton in February 1994 with another threat of air strikes against the Serbs around the city of Sarajevo. This continues to be the US position.

Now let us examine the Vance-Owen Plan. This plan was the result of several months of UN-European Community (EC) sponsored negotiations involving all three sides in the conflict. It proposed to divide the country seen at Appendix A into 10 autonomous provinces with a weak central government. The Bosnian Croats and the Muslims both approved the plan by March 1993. But the Bosnian Serbs, while agreeing to parts of the plan, adamantly rejected the boundaries set forth for the provinces. (31:9) They did however agree to continue negotiations. The EC countries and Russia strongly supported the plan. The US has vacillated several times on the issue, while still supporting it in principle. (28:--) However, since its initial offering little public discussion has taken place on the issue.

NATO has recently figured prominently in the process of negotiations and is currently supporting the airlift of humanitarian supplies and a full-time aircap over the country. The NATO-sponsored air operations are in fact the largest ongoing series of military air missions flown over Southern Europe since World War II. (7:49) Over 200 aircraft now operate in the region dropping humanitarian supplies and providing an aircap against illegal flights into and over the country. The airdrops have involved primarily C-130 and C-160 aircraft. (14:--) These aircraft off load supplies on the ground in places like Sarajevo and airdrop supplies and food to all war-torn parts of the country. Air-to-ground attack aircraft and air-to-air fighters

fly continually in the region, preparing for operations with the UNPROFOR forces or other allies should the need arise. In February 1994, they shot down 4 Serb ground attack aircraft which was the first hostile use of NATO airpower ever. (23:35) These aircraft come from at least seven different countries, with both air force and navy assets. Typically, 30 to 40 sorties are flown throughout the day. (7:50)

The final player in the current effort is the US Congress. Beside the on-going rhetoric reported in the newspapers, the Congress has done some substantive work looking into the problem through testimony given to several committees. The US Senate began with hearings early on in the conflict. In August 1992, the Senate Armed Services Committee had hearings discussing military solutions to the problem, along with a background analysis. (28:--). We will look at the analysis later on in the paper. Other testimony was given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1993 and again in April 1993. (1:--; 2:--). These hearings recommended to President Clinton eight courses of action. The most forceful of these were to order immediate air strikes, to strengthen UNPROFOR, to continue the embargoes, to engage in interdiction efforts, and to continue diplomatic pressure. (2:15)

#### IV. COURSES OF ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES

Now that we have a basic understanding of the problem, let us look at some of the possible courses of action that the US can take to stop the fighting or at least to lessen the on-going violence.

1. **INVASION/OCCUPATION**--This is a popular course of action for the peaceniks and people who have not really studied the situation. Even if we disregard the background and fail to remember that this situation has been going on for centuries, the problems of a full-scale military solution are very formidable.



Let us begin this part by looking at the area itself to see what kinds of military actions could be required. To begin with, the Bosnia-Herzegovina region, seen at Appendix A, covers 19,776 square miles or about the size of the state of West Virginia. It contains only 12 miles of coastline and shares 523 miles of its borders with Croatia and 194 miles with Serbia. The climate is characterized by hot summers and cold winters with severe winters the case in the higher mountain region. Thirty-six percent of the country is forest and woodland with the Dinaric Alps running the length of the country, primarily along the coast. (15:8) A closer look at the map at Appendix A reveals the entire country to be primarily mountainous. Appendix C points to the major civilian populated areas with Sarajevo the capital.

This quick overview points to some problem areas right away for military options. First, rugged mountains covered with forests and thick European weather is not a place conducive to swift military operations. We never want to fight the last war, but we can see this would not provide favorable conditions such as we had in DESERT STORM. Second, terrain of this nature provides an enemy with cover to move and hide. The Yugoslavian Government learned their lessons well from Tito. They prepared to fight their wars as he had done in World War II, from the mountains, using hidden caches of arms which were placed there in preparation for any future wars. In fact, Bosnia was the central location for hidden caches of arms for all of the former Yugoslavia. (30:10) The Serbs are now taking advantage of these assets just as Tito had planned. Third, this terrain favors the current holder much as the terrain in Afghanistan did the freedom fighters and the jungles did the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in Vietnam.

Well, if we viewed favorably the military option, then what should the strategy be. The first part we would need to define would be the objective. Although the US has never articulated one, for the purposes of this paper let us call it Peacemaking. Currently, we are attempting peacemaking through the UN but only in the diplomatic arena. Since we have no

desire to conquer the country or to maintain a permanent presence there, this approach seems reasonable and appropriate. However, peacemaking is very difficult to accomplish in a combat situation. Therefore, the cessation of armed hostilities on all sides throughout the country must be a primary and essential first step.

Now that we have an objective, we will use the Snyder model to see what our assets would be. To do this, we must assume the President defines this as a vital national interest and wants to treat it like DESERT STORM. Also, we are directed to use all the assets needed to accomplish the mission, to begin the operations within 6 months, and to accomplish the objective with minimum casualties. This gives us the monumental task of building a coalition under the UN umbrella and solving the logistics problem. We will shortly go into the specifics, but the US Army estimates at least an entire Field Army of 400,000 troops would be required in Bosnia. (28:38) As mentioned previously, in DESERT STORM the United States used 532,000 troops and took almost 6 months to build the logistics trail to support it. (6:74) Now that we have the estimate of assets and the objective, we need "a plan" to finish our strategy.

The plan must first of all assume that the cities must be secured because we have no massive allied ports in which to off load or border countries sympathetic enough from which to allow us to launch an invasion. Again, refer to the map at Appendix A and D. This would give us a "cities' first", and then a countryside plan of attack--all from the air! Right away we can see the futility because the effort to move that massive amount of logistics is staggering. Secondly, then let us assume that we have the ports available in Croatia. This would be an excellent opportunity but currently Croatia only allows the US to use their country as a humanitarian relief staging point. However, if the UN could convince Croatia, then at least we could have several available ports from which to stage. If the ports were available, then the peacemaking objective could be staged from multiple axes into the country, again see

**Appendix C. In other words, this would amount to an invasion or occupation depending on the resistance.**

**Let us now look at what the US Army bases its estimates on for the peacemaking effort in Bosnia. In August 1992, the Senate Armed Services Committee heard testimony from several sources. Then Lt General McCaffrey, US Army Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave the following estimates of the various warring factions in the conflict:**

**WARRING FACTIONS**

|                                      |                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| <b>Bosnian Serb Army</b>             | <b>35,000 Troops</b> | <b>Several hundred vehicles,<br/>600 artillery, &amp; 300 tanks</b> |
| <b>Bosnian Serb Irregulars</b>       | <b>35,000 Troops</b> | <b>Small arms &amp; mortars</b>                                     |
| <b>Bosnian Croat Forces</b>          | <b>35,000 Troops</b> | <b>Small arms, tanks, &amp; artillery</b>                           |
| <b>Croatian Defense Forces</b>       | <b>15,000 Troops</b> | <b>50 tanks &amp; 100 artillery</b>                                 |
| <b>Bosnian Muslim Defense Forces</b> | <b>50,000 Troops</b> | <b>Small arms &amp; limited artillery</b>                           |

**(28:26)**

**Now that we have an estimate of the various contending forces and their strengths, we need to look at what would be required for effective peacekeeping. First, we have the rough estimates for ground troops given by Gen McCaffrey. During World War II, the Yugoslavs lost 1.7 million people in four years fighting the Germans. (28:39) As we have seen from earlier in this paper, there is a strong history of conflict and fighting. Next, if all your people and supplies are not clearly delineated, how can we distinguish between friend or foe?. The language of Serbo-Croatian is spoken by 99% of the country and there is no easily distinguishable feature to tell them apart. (15:8) The situation could be like Vietnam or Lebanon all over again.**

This situation suggests the fallacy of a peacekeeping/peacemaking invasion or occupation--What can be done other than protecting yourself after putting troops in place? There is no doubt that a force equal to the one Gen McCaffrey estimated could sweep through the country in a matter of days. They doubtless could stop the fighting on all sides much like the initial stages of RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, but then what? Furthermore, when 18 Rangers were lost in Somalia, the American people and the US Congress clamored for a withdrawal just like the clamor for the withdrawal in Lebanon. Is this another case of a poorly thought-out foreign policy initiative? Even though sides could be easily separated, what of the ethnic cleansing and brutality after the troops withdrew? The situation would be back to square one. In my opinion, no invasion or occupation by American Troops would be worth the price to the American people.

2. **AIR STRIKES**--Now, we can discuss the use of air strikes with no ground forces. This is the latest option proclaimed by airpower advocates. NATO aircraft have performed an admirable job keeping air-to-ground aircraft from any side from entering the conflict. Also, they aggressively enforced the airspace in March 1994 by downing 4 Serbian attack aircraft. Once again however, we must ask ourselves what is the purpose of airpower? When did any side ever win a war with airpower alone? What are we actually doing or hoping to do with airpower? Again we must make assumptions. The NATO defense of the airspace over Bosnia is well defined, with clear rules of engagement and command and control procedures. (7:50) The mission has been costly in dollars but not in human life. Airpower advocates have taken from that success, along with the beautiful pictures of DESERT STORM, and assumed that an air war in Bosnia would be all that is required. Unfortunately, there are problems with this assumption.

First, we must remember that we would not be fighting a war in the desert or battling the Soviets at the Fulda Gap with our own mutually trained forces on the ground. The use of

airpower in this situation would be much like the Soviets' use of airpower in Afghanistan. From day one of their invasion, they maintained air superiority. However, the guerrillas challenged that superiority, not through the use of aircraft, but through Stinger missiles. Perhaps this would not happen, but the parallel is possible.

Now, looking at the nature of the targets, we see that target sets are extremely difficult. There are three fighting factions today in this war. Even telling the difference on the ground is very difficult; to do so at 600 knots is exponentially harder. Sorting out artillery or other targets amidst SA-7 and SA-9 missiles, with no ground troops identifying targets for the pilots, is extremely hard. (9:23) It might be necessary to resort to destroying virtually anything that fired artillery or rockets. The interspersed civilians and prisoners of the different sides would create a high risk for civilian or friendly casualties, and casualties of any kind are something for which Americans have a low tolerance.

Third, the low clouds and terrain are much like Vietnam. The initial strategy is much the same as well. The US began the Vietnam War by introducing airpower alone into the fight, which is now being repeated in Bosnia. It is an attractive idea to let other forces do the fighting while US precision airpower does the hard work. However, it is not that simple. Just as in Vietnam, in this case Serbia/Montenegro, an outside country, is actively intervening militarily. Would NATO, led by the US eventually feel it necessary to carry the war to Serbia?

Finally, would the Bosnians be better off even if targets could be differentiated? The big guns might be silenced for a while, but would the situation be better or worse after this use of airpower? Just because the fighting ceases in Sarajevo, does this mean it will cease everywhere? The fact will remain that over 26,000 UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia would probably remain, which are now lightly armed and currently not the target for any of the three sides. (5:1) If US or NATO airpower is introduced directly into the conflict, these forces

would most surely become the focus of anger. Additionally, the use of airpower without ground troops would in no way stop the bitter fighting and hatred. An example of this is after downing 4 Serb aircraft in February 1994, the fighting continued outside Sarajevo while the truce was still sporadically being broken.

**3. ARMS EMBARGO**--When we speak of embargo, we are talking about the UN Security Council embargo against importing any firearms for use against the elected government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (12:479) That is because the UN has no means to monitor the border with Serbia or Croatia and thus the border is open to import every weapon imaginable to help two of the three warring factions. The third, the Muslims, must rely on what was on hand at the war's beginning, what can be stolen or captured from the enemy, or smuggled in against the UN embargo. If the UN embargo could be evenly applied to all factions then it would not hurt the most injured faction.

Madeleine Albright, the US Permanent Representative to the UN, articulated the problem of the embargo by stating that: "... the US reaffirms its belief that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a sovereign state and member of the United Nations, has a right to defend itself and any embargo against that places an unintended yet devastating effect in favor of the aggressor." (12:479)

The US Senate passed a non-binding resolution in January 1994 also urging the lifting of the embargo and admonishing the Bush and Clinton administrations for a lack of leadership on this issue. (27:17) The intent of the UN policy may be well-meaning if it were enforced, but currently it is not. This brings us to the final course of action.

**4. SANCTIONS**--There is no doubt that the major actors against the Bosnian government are the Serbs and the Croats. As such, the allies in concert with NATO and the UN should strictly enforce the sanctions currently in place. This should include but not be limited to inspecting all ships destined for their coastal ports and monitoring the rail lines into

their countries to watch for arms. The UN embargo is well-defined. For example, the humanitarian flights into Sarajevo cannot bring green clothing into the country for fear it will be used for military purposes. (14:-- ) The UN needs to place forces along all the borders into Bosnia in order to assure that the sanctions are observed by all sides. The NATO aircap over the country has managed to effectively stop aggressor flights in the fighting and enforce sanctions from the air.

This recommendation will not be received well by either Serbia or Croatia. The allied coalition enforced sanctions against Iraq both on the borders and away from the borders by enforcing a tight embargo. A similar one is needed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, one partially enforced, would for the most part be ineffective due to the relatively limited scope of the fighting. A more comprehensive embargo would require a coalition effort similar to the effort used in the aircap.

## CONCLUSIONS


The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina today is very complex. From senseless atrocities to ethnic violence and back to simple wartime fighting, there are no clear answers. This paper has laid out four possible alternatives for the UN in this struggle. Military action, air strikes, embargo, and sanctions are all possible answers. However, as in any complex issue, there are no simple solutions.

Military action and simple air strikes are both answers that the uninformed citizen might find attractive. Out of frustration in any negotiations, it seems that the military is like Clausewitz said, just an extension of politics. However, the onetime cost of this solution is much too high for the American people to tolerate. Americans prefer quick and bloodless solutions. In this conflict however, the warfare has been going on since the 7th century and

even if we do use these two avenues, as before there will be no clear winners. Instead there will only be new players on the battlefield replacing the Turks, the Austro-Hungarians, the Germans, and the Soviets.

The final UN answer must be a combination of force and negotiations. First, the unequal weapons embargo should be revised to level the playing field, thus allowing the Muslims to adequately protect themselves. Next, the existing sanctions against Serbia and Croatia should be fully enforced by the UN, NATO, the US and probably most important, Russia. Third, negotiate continually on all fronts. Finally, retain the other UN resolutions, thereby bringing the influence of the UN and the international community to bear through humanitarian aid, the UNPROFOR and the aircap. These four answers probably are not the only ones, but given the current situation, in my opinion they are the most feasible.






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# APPENDIX A

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596-009

Former Yugoslavia



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APPENDIX B

# Newly Independent Balkan States



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## APPENDIX C

## Eastern Europe



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## APPENDIX D

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